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Abstract 
The power to name is both an awesome and awful power – it is 
an exercise of sovereign power. In the Abrahamic religions, the 
monotheistic God is the ultimate sovereign. The power to name God, 
then, is one of the most magnificent powers that is conceivable to 
humans: it is the sovereign power to name the ultimate sovereign. It is 
this naming of God that has been put on trial in Malaysia. The state 
decrees that the name ‘Allah’ is only to be used in reference to the 
Islamic God. Christians, in response, have insisted that the state has no 
monopoly over the power to name God, and they too should be able to 
call their God – the Christian God – by the name of ‘Allah’. The matter 
ends up in court, where judges are asked to decide on the name of 
God. This case raises a perplexing puzzle: how on earth did the human 
judges in Malaysia end up with the power to name the divine judge? 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol18/iss1/12 
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The Name of God on Trial: 
Narratives of law, religion and state in Malaysia 
Joshua Neoh  
The right of the masters to confer names extends so far that one should 
allow oneself to grasp the origin of language itself as the expression 
of the power of the rulers: they say ‘this is such and such’, they put 
their seal on each thing and event with a sound and in the process 
take possession of it (Nietzsche 1996: 13).
Introduction
The power to name is both an awesome and awful power – it is 
an exercise of sovereign power. In the Abrahamic religions, the 
monotheistic God is the ultimate sovereign. The power to name God, 
then, is one of the most magnificent powers that is conceivable to 
humans: it is the sovereign power to name the ultimate sovereign. It is 
this naming of God that has been put on trial in Malaysia. The state 
decrees that the name ‘Allah’ is only to be used in reference to the 
Islamic God. Christians, in response, have insisted that the state has no 
monopoly over the power to name God, and they too should be able to 
call their God – the Christian God – by the name of ‘Allah’. The matter 
ends up in court, where judges are asked to decide on the name of 
God. This case raises a perplexing puzzle: how on earth did the human 
judges in Malaysia end up with the power to name the divine judge? 
On an explanatory level, this paper charts the story of how this 
peculiar state of affairs came to be, that is, how the name of God came 
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to be put on trial in the courts in Malaysia. The story runs from the 
postcolonial settlement that resulted in the Federal Constitution till 
the Federal Court decision that upheld the ban on the use of the name 
Allah by non-Muslims. The story will identify the various actors and 
agents, forces and pressures, twists and turns, which led to the name of 
God being put on trial in Malaysia. In (re)telling this story about the 
trial of Allah, more ambitiously, this paper also attempts to provide a 
meta-narrative of the various narratives and counter-narratives of law, 
religion and state in postcolonial Malaysia. 
On an analytical level, this paper argues that the Malaysian 
postcolonial constitutional settlement is precarious – not only because 
the constitution is an ‘incompletely theorized agreement’ (Sunstein 
2007: 1) – but also because it speaks with two discordant voices and 
presents two conflicting visions on issues of law, religion and state. In 
effect, there are two constitutions embedded in the one constitutional 
text. The constitutional text engages in double-speak and presents 
a double vision of the Malaysian polity. This bifurcation in the 
constitutional text makes the postcolonial constitutional settlement a 
precarious arrangement because its meaning is internally incoherent 
and inherently unstable. 
While this constitutional duality may not provide the benefit 
of stability, it may, ironically, create the benefit of longevity. Two 
competing camps can appeal to the same constitutional text, with the 
result that the ensuing ideological competition is contained within the 
constitution itself. Proponents on both sides of the ideological divide 
can find their voices and visions in the same constitutional text, drawing 
on the same document to support opposing views. Thus, both sides can 
construct their own narratives and counter-narratives from the available 
constitutional materials. The methodological maneuver of this paper 
is to advance this analytical argument through the explanatory story 
of how the Allah ban became one of the most explosive inter-religious 
controversies in Malaysia. 
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1   Postcolonial (Un)Settlement
The unsettledness of the postcolonial settlement on the question of 
the relationship between law, religion and state in Malaysia is nowhere 
better illustrated than in art 3 of the Federal Constitution. Article 3(1) 
states that ‘Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions 
may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation’; 
this clause is coupled with the proviso in clause (4) that ‘nothing in this 
Article derogates from any other provision of this Constitution’. Art 
3(1) is supposed to be innocuous because of the proviso in clause (4). 
However, this article is now at the centre of constitutional contestation 
in Malaysia. This article may be the tail that wags the dog. 
The Constitution was drafted by the Reid Commission, which 
consisted of Lord Reid (UK); Sir Ivor Jennings (UK); Sir William 
McKell (Australia); Justice Malik (India); and Justice Abdul Hamid 
(Pakistan). The Commission took evidence in Malaya from political 
parties, organisations and individuals from June to October 1956, and 
submitted a draft Constitution to the Alliance government, the Malay 
Rulers and the Colonial Office on 20 February 1957 (Fernando 2006: 
249; see also Fernando 2002). In its Report which accompanied the 
draft Constitution, the Commission stated that, although ‘there has 
been included in the Federal Constitution a declaration that Islam is 
the religion of the Federation, this will not in any way affect the present 
position of the Federation as a secular state’ (1957: [57]). Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaya, restated this principle in 
Parliament on 1 May 1958, about a year after Independence, when he 
said: ‘I would like to make it clear that this country is not an Islamic 
state as it is generally understood; we merely provide that Islam shall 
be the official religion of the state’ (Parliamentary Hansard 1958). 
The text of the constitution states that Islam is the religion of the 
Federation, but the accompanying report states that the Federation is 
a secular state. Equivocation is not unusual in constitutional texts and 
commission reports in order for them to placate different and competing 
interest groups; but what we see here is not just equivocation, but 
contradiction. It may not be an irreconcilable contradiction, but it is a 
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contradiction nonetheless. There is a perceptible conflict between the 
text of the constitution and the accompanying report. The Commission 
says one thing in the report, but does another thing in the constitutional 
text. If we follow what the report says, then it raises the question of why 
art 3(1) was inserted at all. If we follow the text of the constitution, what 
then should we make of the repeated assurances by the Commission 
and the founding Prime Minister that the new Federation was to be 
a secular state? One nullifies the other. Malaysians were saddled with 
the paradoxical puzzle of figuring out how a state can simultaneously 
have an official religion while remaining secular. Instead of binding 
the people, the Constitution left the people in a bind. 
Adding to the puzzle is art 11(1), which guarantees that ‘every 
person has the right to profess and practise his religion and, subject to 
Clause (4), to propagate it’; Clause (4) provides that state and federal 
law ‘may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or 
belief among persons professing the religion of Islam’. Art 11(1) may not 
exactly mean what it says. In the case of Lina Joy, the majority of the 
Federal Court ruled that the right to profess and practise one’s religion 
does not extend to the right to convert out of Islam (see Neoh 2008). 
In the Federal Court’s judgment, religious profession is distinguished 
from religious conversion – the former is protected and guaranteed by 
the Constitution, while the latter is not. The current interpretation of 
the religious conversion law creates an asymmetrical situation, in which 
non-Muslims can freely convert to Islam, but Muslims cannot convert 
out of Islam. Conversion out of Islam is criminalised as apostasy. In 
addition to the distinction between profession and conversion that was 
introduced by the Federal Court, art 11 stipulates another distinction 
– between profession and propagation. The restriction on propagation 
similarly creates an asymmetrical situation: Muslims can propagate 
Islam to non-Muslims, but non-Muslims cannot propagate non-Islamic 
beliefs to Muslims. 
Another conundrum was added to the Constitution through a 
constitutional amendment in 1988. Art 121(1) confers judicial power 
on the High Courts in Malaya and in Sabah and Sarawak. Art 121(1A) 
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was inserted in 1988, stating that ‘the courts referred to in Clause (1) 
shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction 
of the Syariah [i.e. Islamic] courts’. Just as there is uncertainty over 
the function and effect of art 3(1), there is a similar uncertainty over 
the function and effect of art 121(1A). If Malaysia is not already an 
Islamic state by virtue of art 3(1), is art 121(1A) a step in that direction? 
More specifically, does art 121(1A) create two parallel, co-equal and 
mutually exclusive jurisdictions between the common law courts 
and the syariah law courts, or do the common law courts maintain 
supervisory jurisdiction over the syariah law courts? 
The common law tradition was introduced into British Malaya 
during the colonial era. The post-colonial Constitution endorsed the 
continued operation of the common law after independence (see Neoh 
2010). Article 160 of the Constitution stipulates that the word ‘law’ 
in the Constitution includes the common law, and art 162 preserves 
the continuity of pre-independence laws, including the common law 
(affirmed in Che Omar bin Che Soh v Public Prosecutor). In providing 
for the common law system to be the national legal system, syariah 
law is not entirely abrogated. Since independence, the role of Islamic 
law has been preserved in a formalised syariah court structure that 
operates under the jurisdiction of the respective states (see sch 9 of the 
Constitution). However, the syariah courts are inferior courts in the 
sense of having limited jurisdiction ratio personae and ratio materiae: 
syariah law only applies to ‘persons professing the religion of Islam’ 
and its field of operation is limited to the matters enumerated in the 
Constitution, which mostly relate to personal and family law (Thio 
2007: 197). 
Prior to the insertion of art 121(1A), the orthodox view was that 
the common law was the general law of the land that was applicable 
to both Muslims and non-Muslims in matters of public and private 
law, while limited legal space was provided for syariah law to operate 
in the periphery in matters of personal and family law. Barry Hooker 
divides interacting legal systems into two classes: dominant and 
servient. A dominant system manifests itself as the sole determinant 
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of legality within a territorial boundary and enjoys institutional and 
political superiority, while a servient legal system exists ‘subject to the 
demands and through the forms of the dominant system’ (Hooker 
1975: 453-4). Using Hooker’s taxonomy, common law is the dominant 
legal system in Malaysia with general jurisdiction, while syariah law 
is the servient legal system with limited jurisdiction. On this reading, 
syariah law exists ‘only for the purpose of providing personal law for 
Muslims’ in matters of marriage, custody, inheritance and the like, and 
it is not intended to be a source of public law values (Harding 2002: 
167). What many Malaysian public law scholars thought was settled 
became unsettled with the addition of art 121(1A). In recent times, 
there is the increasing assertion that the syariah law courts and the 
common law courts are equal and equally dominant, and that both are 
sources of public law values. This argument was brought to new heights 
in the Allah case when it was argued that public law can be used – and 
should be used – to defend the sanctity of Islam. 
2   Competing Narratives
‘Constitutions are, in part, a story that a country tells about itself ’ 
(Evans 2009: 437). Understood as narratives, the constitution becomes, 
not merely a set of rules to be observed, but a normative world – a nomos 
– in which we live (Cover 1983: 4). A nomos imposes a vision on reality. 
The gap between vision and reality is bridged through the creation of a 
narrative, which explains the reality – both past and present – and tells us 
how we can make the vision a future reality. The contest of constitutional 
interpretation is a contestation over the creation of meaning through 
narrative. However, the nature of hermeneutics, including legal 
hermeneutics, is that meaning is radically unstable. The unity of meaning 
and the unifying force of narrative are constantly being shattered – 
‘shattered, in fact, with its very creation’ (Cover 1983: 16). There may be 
a stable written text, which we call the Constitution, but there is seldom 
a stable narrative about the meaning of the text. Whichever story the 
state chooses, ‘alternative stories still provide normative bases for the 
growth of distinct constitutional worlds’ (Cover 1983: 19). 
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The nature of constitutional narratives is such that there will be 
a multiplicity of constitutional worlds, a multiplicity of nomoi. Each 
nomos – each constitutional world – has its own internal coherence 
which weaves together, not only a collection of rules, but also ‘a 
disparate group of characters, settings, activities, and tensions into a 
meaningful whole’, in which ‘characters are sifted into minor or major, 
good or evil, passive or active’ (Evans 2009: 438). 
Competing constitutional narratives are traceable to the 
constitutional text insofar as they are competing textual narratives. By 
telling different stories about the genesis and telos of the text, different 
ideological groups endow the text with different, even opposing, 
meanings. Hence, a constitutional text often has a multiplicity of 
readings, that is, one can often read the constitutional text in multiple 
ways depending on the framing narratives that one adopts (see Neoh 
2013). To the extent that the meanings of the text are dependent on 
the accompanying narratives, there is no sharp distinction between text 
and narrative. And to the extent that the constitutional narratives are 
presented as interpretations of the text itself, competing narratives are 
refracted as textual inconsistencies. Consequently, law, text and culture 
merge into a composite whole. 
In Malaysian constitutional discourse, two main competing 
narratives are told about the origin and the future of the Malaysian 
polity. On the one hand is the evolutionary story of an orderly transition 
of power from British Malaya to the independent Malaysia which 
maintained the largely secular structure of the state; on the other 
hand is the revolutionary story of a largely Muslim people’s movement 
that overthrew the yoke of colonial rule and set up a new state with 
Islam as the religion of the state (Evans 2009: 454). The latter story is 
revolutionary in two senses. The word ‘revolution’ has two seemingly 
contradictory meanings: it is often used to denote the destruction 
of the old political structure and the start of a new political era, but 
this meaning of the word ‘revolution’ is superimposed upon an older 
meaning of the word, whose root word is revolve, which denotes 
a return to the old or original position. The two meanings of the 
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word revolution, as applied to the Islamic story in Malaysia, are not 
contradictory, but complementary. What the proponents of the Islamic 
narrative are arguing is that the declaration of independence marks a 
radical break from colonial rule and a return to the pre-colonial Islamic 
rule, whether real or imagined. Insofar as the evolutionists tell the story 
of a progressive future towards a gradual realisation of individual and 
civil rights, we can call them liberals; insofar as the revolutionists tell 
the story of a return to an imagined collectivist past, we can call them 
conservatives. 
The evolutionists tell the story of how the Constitution was 
‘drafted by a group of men who shared a common law, Westminster 
government background’; and how the Constitution was designed to 
ensure ‘continuity and connectedness to the community of British 
former colonies, with some indigenous elements to recognise the 
particularities of Malaysian culture and history’ (Evans 2009: 449). 
They emphasise the Reid Commission Report, which states that the 
new Federation would be a largely secular state. The state secularism 
referred to by the Reid Commission is a continuation of a particular 
kind of colonial secularism which is marked by a non-interventionist 
stance by the state in matters of religion (Yeoh 2011: 93). 
The evolutionists posit a restrictive reading of art 3 which limits 
the role of Islam to largely ceremonial matters. With regard to the 
freedom of religion, they emphasise the centrality of the protection 
provided under art 11(1) as the bedrock of interreligious harmony in 
Malaysia. While they argue for a restrictive reading of art 3, they argue 
for an expansive reading of art 11(1). With regard to the jurisdictional 
disputes, they emphasise the superiority and primacy of the common 
law courts over the syariah courts. According to the evolutionists, the 
common law courts predated the Constitution as courts of general 
jurisdiction; and the Constitution entrenches that juridical order. The 
common law courts are the ultimate guardian and custodian of the 
Constitution.  
The revolutionists tell a very different story: from their point of 
view, the Reid Commission was an attempt by the British to maintain 
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colonial power in postcolonial Malaysia by suppressing the Islamic 
identity of Malaysia (Evans 2009: 450). By delegitimising the Reid 
Commission, they elevate the importance of art 3 which makes Islam 
the religion of the Federation. In a symmetrical reversal of the position 
of the evolutionists, the revolutionists argue for an expansive reading 
of art 3 and a restrictive reading of art 11(1). The restrictive reading 
of the freedom of religion provision under art 11(1) would mean, inter 
alia, that conversion out of Islam is excluded from the protection of 
the freedom of religion. Therefore, pursuant to an expansive reading 
of art 3, the state may take action to advance the position, and thereby 
safeguard the superiority, of Islam in the Federation. With regard to 
the jurisdictional disputes, they argue for the equality of power and 
status between the common law courts and the syariah law courts. 
What the revolutionists want to achieve may be characterised as a 
form of constitutional theocracy, which embeds principles of theocratic 
governance within the framework of constitutionalism (Hirschl 2010: 
2). They articulate their theocratic aspirations through the language of 
the constitution. Their narrative brings together post-colonial forms of 
governmentality with pre-colonial imaginings.
The normative claims of the Islamic revolutionists rest on a 
particular historical narrative that goes as follows: 
After the Malay rulers and people embraced Islam in the 15th century, 
attempts were made to modify Malay customs so as to conform to 
Islam and to adopt Islamic law; the process can be seen in the various 
versions of the Malacca [code] (Ibrahim 1981: 21). 
This process, so the story goes, was in train prior to colonisation. 
According to the revolutionists, ‘Muslim law would have [become] 
the law of Malaya had not British law stepped in to check it’ (Ibrahim 
1981: 21; see also Dawson & Thiru 2007: 158). In this story, ‘a 
counter-factual narrative of an imagined, non-colonised Malaysia is 
developed as though there was only one possible, natural development 
of Malaysian society absent colonialism’ (Evans 2009: 463). Their 
argument relies explicitly on a counter-factual narrative, rather than on 
a factual narrative of the actual history of constitutional development 
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in Malaysia. They situate their reading of the constitution within this 
counter-factual narrative. Counter-factual narratives are no less potent 
than factual ones. 
3   Bureaucratic Simplification
While at the discursive level, there may be competing narratives in 
circulation, the government has to get on with the job of governing the 
population. Bureaucrats have to get on with the job of administration. 
Without resolving the national identity tensions, the governmental and 
bureaucratic strategy has been to divide and categorise Malaysians by 
race and religion. The transition ‘from colonialism to nationalism’ was 
accomplished through the framework of race and religion (Mohamad 
2008: 296). Race and religion were essentialised ‘for the administrative 
ease of multicultural management’ (Mohamad 2008: 294).  
Of particular importance is the identity of ethnic Malays. What it 
means to be a Malay is entrenched in the Constitution: under art 160, 
‘“Malay” means a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually 
speaks the Malay language, and conforms to Malay custom’. Malays are, 
by constitutional definition, Muslims; and the Federal Court in Lina Joy 
tells us that they have no constitutional right to convert out of Islam. 
Hence, to say that a Malay person is a Muslim is a legal tautology. The 
definition of Malayness is important because that ethnic status carries 
with it certain special privileges, some of which are entrenched in art 
153 of the Constitution. Therefore, the boundary separating Malays 
from non-Malays has to be patrolled rigorously. The Allah ban plays 
a crucial role in fortifying the Malay-non-Malay, or Muslim-non-
Muslim, border. The ban is, inter alia, a form of border patrol. 
James Scott posits legibility to be the central concern of modern 
statecraft. State officials often take exceptionally complex, local social 
practices, and create a standard map or grid whereby these practices 
can be centrally recorded and monitored; statecraft is devoted to 
rationalising and standardising complex social practices into a legible 
and administratively more convenient format for purposes of political 
surveillance (Scott 1998: 2-3). The executive ban on non-Muslims from 
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using the word Allah, along with the subsequent judicial endorsement 
of it, is part of this state project of legibility. We see the dynamics of 
simplification, division and hierarchisation in the control of language 
use. If you are a Muslim, your God is Allah. If you are a non-Muslim, 
your God is Tuhan, which is another Malay word for God. Reordering 
the social landscape by renaming it is a vital step in the project of 
legibility. Names, even or especially the name of God, play an essential 
role in determining cultural identities and affiliations (Scott, Tehranian 
& Mathias 2002: 6). They impose a certain vision and division on 
society. As the quotation from Nietzsche in the epigraph indicates, 
the power to name is an exercise of sovereign power that is, at once, 
awesome and awful. 
While the concept of legibility explains the logic of governmentality, 
there is a subset to that logic, namely, the specific logic of religious 
administration within the bureaucratic structure of the Malaysian 
government. While Scott focuses on legibility, Geertz focuses on 
rationalisation as a process of cultural and religious change that entails 
a standardisation and systematisation of cultural and religious practices. 
This rationalising process is characterised by 
two analytically separate sets of entailments: first, a rethinking 
and reconfiguring of key symbols and their meanings to better 
accommodate them to each other and to changing social and 
cultural realities; and, second, institutional or social organizational 
changes that help motivate, buttress, or sustain this rethinking and 
reconfiguring (Peletz 1993: 67). 
Translated into the Malaysian context, a Geertzian argument will 
proceed as follows. First, there is an effort by the Islamic bureaucrats to 
reconfigure the symbols of Islam in a way that asserts their exclusivity 
and superiority; and they have identified the word ‘Allah’ as one such 
key symbol. Hence, they need to make the term special to Muslims, 
vis-à-vis non-Muslims. Second, to enforce this new configuration, 
they need to deploy the full apparatus of the state, including its laws, 
to enforce this exclusivity. The religious bureaucratic administration, 
with the backing of the other arms of government, has many formal 
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enforcement mechanisms at its disposal, such as the withdrawal of 
publishing permit and the seizure of Malay-language Christian bibles 
with the word Allah in them. 
The monopoly on Allah as the name of the Islamic God strengthens 
and elevates the official ethnic category of Malay-Muslim that the 
state created. I said earlier that, under the current regime, if you are 
a Muslim, your God is Allah; if you are a non-Muslim, your God is 
Tuhan. However, the division is not so neat: if you are a Muslim, you 
are still allowed to use the word Tuhan; the first of the five national 
precepts is Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan (Belief in God). Thus, Muslims 
have monopoly over Allah, but share Tuhan with non-Muslims. This 
twist is unsurprising, because, for the purpose of communication 
between different religious groups in a multi-religious setting, the 
Malay language needs a generic term to refer to God. Hence, Tuhan 
becomes the generic term for God as well as the term that the state 
wants non-Muslims to use when referring to their specific God(s). As 
a generic term, Tuhan includes Allah. This twist changes the power 
play between Allah and Tuhan.  
By containing and restricting Allah to Muslims, Allah is made 
specific and exclusive to Muslims. This investment of exclusivity to 
Allah, vis-à-vis Tuhan, can be understood through the lens of the 
Durkheimian sacred–profane dichotomy. Durkheim uses the sacred-
profane dichotomy to delineate the natural from the supernatural. The 
natural is common, everyday and therefore profane. The supernatural 
is set apart, special and therefore sacred. The Malaysian state seems 
to go one step further than Durkheim to make this distinction within 
the supernatural realm itself. Within the pantheon of Gods, there is 
the common, general and generic Tuhan and the special, protected and 
exclusive Allah. Under the current regime, the exclusively Islamic Allah 
is a sacred term, while the generic Tuhan is a profane term. 
In this project of legibility, not only does the government have to 
impose categories on society, it has to make the categories mutually 
exclusive and, to a certain degree, antagonistic. Hence, one of the 
rationales given by the government to justify the restriction on the 
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word Allah is that its usage by non-Muslims, especially Christians, will 
confuse Muslims and ‘draw them to Christianity’ (International Herald 
Tribune 7 January 2008: [10]). This rhetoric portrays Christianity as the 
antagonistic ‘Other’ who must be kept at bay at all cost. The rhetoric 
of confusion reinforces the idea of border patrol: first, Muslims have 
to better demarcate its religious boundary ‘whose sanctity and overall 
integrity have been (or are perceived to have been) seriously threatened’; 
second, they have to ‘stave off the confusion, disorder, and chaos’ that 
are ‘frequently implicated in threats to sanctified boundaries’ (Peletz 
1993: 92). We will see this rhetoric and motif of confusion resurfacing 
in the judicial judgment that we will examine in the next section. 
The legibility and the rationalisation theses are, by and large, a 
correct explanation of the bureaucratic rationality underlying the 
promulgation of the initial regulation, which prohibits non-Muslims 
from using the term Allah. The plausibility of these theses are reinforced 
by the fact that the ever expanding Islamic departments within the 
state bureaucracy have their own administrative hierarchies and 
priorities, and the initial regulation on the use of the word came from 
within the state bureaucracy, not from their political masters. Once 
the regulation was out in the open, in the public sphere, their political 
masters endorsed it and simply went along with it. 
Bureaucratic rationality taps into the larger discursive narratives, but 
simplifies them in the process, the result of which is the presentation of 
half-digested narratives in terms of policies. Behind every government 
policy is a larger, richer and denser network of competing narratives. 
The same logic applies with regard to the colonial administration as 
much as the postcolonial government. The colonial period marked a 
key turning point in the institutionalisation of religious authority and 
the state appropriation of religion on the Malay Peninsula, especially 
when the colonial regime introduced what could be termed as ‘Anglo-
Muslim’ law: 
the law was ‘Anglo’ in the sense that the concepts, categories, and 
modes of analysis followed English common law, and it was ‘Muslim’ 
in the sense that it contained fragments of Islamic jurisprudence that 
211
The Name of God on Trial
were applied to Muslim subjects (Moustafa 2014: 157). 
As a consequence of that process, the rich, diverse and varied 
hybrids of Islamic practice and Malay custom were simplified and 
codified in a half-digested form. The ‘expansion and empowering of 
state-controlled Islamic administrative hierarchies that began under 
colonial rule continued after Independence’, which ‘led to the more 
centralised and standardised (rationalised) implementation of Islamic 
religious law’ (Peletz 1993: 78).
The legitimacy of the religious administration in Malaysia – whether 
in the colonial past or the postcolonial present – ‘rests on the emotive 
power of Islamic symbolism, but its principal mode of organisation and 
operation is fundamentally rooted in the Weberian state’ (Moustafa 
2014: 167). One of ways by which the government taps into the emotive 
power of the Islamic narrative is through semantic shifts: ‘Muslim 
law’ was renamed as ‘Islamic law’ and ‘Muslim court’ was renamed as 
‘Syariah court’. These shifts in terminology ‘exchanged the object of 
the law (Muslims) for the purported essence of the law (as Islamic)’, 
thereby elevating the government’s religious credentials (Moustafa 
2014: 160). The regulation on the use of the word Allah and the state-
sanctioned (re)definition of it to refer exclusively to the Islamic God 
is another semantic shift in the same direction. It ignores – or rather, 
simplifies – the complex and variegated use of that term among the 
diverse religious communities in Malaysia. Allah was never, hitherto, 
exclusive to Islam. The government is not codifying a preexisting 
practice; rather, it is attempting, through the coercive force of the 
state, to create a practice, or in the famous words of Hobsbawm (1983), 
to invent a tradition. Instead of merely ‘speaking in God’s name’ (El 
Fadl 2001) or ‘ judging in God’s name’ (Moustafa 2014), the Malaysian 
government goes a step further in dictating God’s name. 
4   Constitutional Contestation
Where the bureaucracy simplifies, the people complicate. The people 
complicate the simplistic picture by appealing to larger narratives. The 
postcolonial unsettlement that is discussed in Part 1 gives rise to the 
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competing narratives that are discussed in Part 2. While the process of 
bureaucratic rationality may attempt to impose a simplified view of the 
state onto the population as discussed in Part 3, the people could always 
appeal to those larger competing narratives to advance their claims and 
challenge the bureaucratic simplification. This process of challenging 
bureaucratic rationality by recourse to foundational narratives and 
counter-narratives is what I term ‘constitutional contestation’. Through 
these competing narratives, constitutional contestations hark back to 
the postcolonial settlement. If there was no settlement that could be 
found, then a settlement would have to be constructed and imputed to 
the past or to ‘the founding fathers’. 
The Catholic Church in Malaysia decided to move their 
dissatisfaction and disaffection over the Allah ban into the arena of 
constitutional contestation. They purported to find support for their 
cause in the constitution. Given that the Malaysian constitution engages 
in double speak and presents a double vision of the Malaysian polity, 
it is unsurprising that the Catholic Church was able to find its voice 
and vision in the same constitutional text as fundamentalist Muslims. 
Opposing groups could raise their discordant voices and present their 
conflicting visions in and through the same document. The Catholic 
Church went to the court to seek the protection of the constitution and 
claim the right that is promised to them. They advanced their claim by 
presenting a liberal, progressive, evolutionary narrative of law, religion 
and state in Malaysia. The High Court agreed with their narrative. 
At the High Court, Lau Bee Lan J began with the principle that 
the freedom of religion is a constitutional right; and any restrictions 
on a constitutional right should be construed strictly (Lau J 2010: 
[19]). The Constitution draws a distinction between the profession of a 
religion, which is guaranteed under art 11(1), and the propagation of a 
religion, which is restricted under art 11(4). Construing the guarantee 
broadly and the restriction strictly, the state cannot ban the use of the 
word Allah if it is used in the course of the profession of a religion, 
although the state may be able to ban it if it is used in the course of the 
propagation of a non-Islamic religion to Muslims. In any case, there 
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cannot be a blanket ban on the use of the word. Turning her mind to 
the recurrent and supposed fear of ‘confusion’, she cautioned that 
the court has to consider the question of ‘avoidance of confusion’ as 
a ground very cautiously so as to obviate a situation where a mere 
confusion of certain persons within a religious group can strip the 
constitutional right of another religious group to practice their religion 
under art 11(1) and to render such guaranteed right as illusory (Lau 
J 2010: [65]). 
With respect to art 3(1), she declared that the Catholic Church 
has the right to use the word ‘Allah’ pursuant to the constitutional 
guarantee that non-Islamic religions may be practised in peace and 
harmony in any part of the Federation, and that the constitutional 
provision of Islam as the religion of the Federation does not empower 
the Home Minister to prohibit the Church from using the word Allah 
(Lau J 2010: [89]).
The Home Minister appealed and presented a conservative and 
revolutionary narrative of law, religion and state in Malaysia. The 
Court of Appeal agreed with the Home Minister and overturned the 
decision of the High Court. In a previous paper examining the case 
of Lina Joy, which effectively upheld Malaysia’s apostasy laws, I asked 
rhetorically whether Malaysian common law judges had become Islamic 
theologians as well (Neoh 2008: 11). The question was meant to carry 
a tinge of sarcasm. However, in light of the Court of Appeal decision 
on the Allah matter, the question no longer sounds sarcastic at all. The 
answer now is clearly yes: the Court of Appeal judges have become 
theologians, and Malaysia has a particular brand of constitutionalism, 
which I shall call ‘theological constitutionalism’. So versatile is the 
Malaysian constitution that even theological concerns could find their 
voice in the constitution. Consequently, theological concerns could 
now be spoken of, and rearticulated, in the constitutional tone of voice. 
Like Lau Bee Lan J at the High Court, Apandi Ali JCA at the 
Court of Appeal addressed the two-pronged provision of art 3(1), but 
he addressed it in a directly opposite way. Art 3(1) states that ‘Islam 
is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised 
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in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation’. The two prongs 
are separated by the conjunction but. Again, we hear the constitution 
speaking in two voices. Apandi JCA began by asserting that the first 
prong of art 3 ‘places the religion of Islam at par with the other basic 
structures of the Constitution’ (Apandi JCA 2013: [31]). He then went 
on to posit that the insertion of the phrase ‘in peace and harmony’ in 
the second prong with regard to the practice of non-Islamic religions 
is meant ‘to protect the sanctity of Islam as the religion of the country 
and also to insulate against…any possible and probable threat to the 
religion of Islam’ (Apandi JCA 2013: [29]). Apandi JCA interpreted the 
phrase ‘in peace and harmony’, not as supporting the freedom of non-
Muslims to practice their religion, but as a limitation on that freedom: 
that freedom is subject to the superiority of Islam in the Federation. 
Even the freedom of religion guarantee under art 11 is subject to the 
supposed superiority of Islam under art 3(1). Hence, if the government 
decides that the usage of the word Allah by non-Muslims would 
constitute a possible and probable threat to Islam, it could impose the 
ban consistent with art 3(1). The threat does not have to be actual, but 
only possible and probable; and the relevant threat here is to Islam as 
a religion, not to national security or public order. 
Thereafter, the tone of the judgment switched from legal analysis 
to theological exposition. Apandi JCA claimed that 
to refuse to acknowledge the essential differences between religions 
will be an affront to the uniqueness of world religions[:] due recognition 
must be given to the names given to their respective Gods in their 
respective Holy books; such as  ‘Yahweh’ the God of the Holy Bible; 
‘Allah’ the God of the Holy al-Quran and ‘Vishnu’ the God of the 
Holy Vedas’ (Apandi JCA 2013: [52]). 
Apandi JCA deemed it appropriate and within his area of judicial 
competence to go around categorising and naming gods, including the 
gods of others. The second judge on the bench of three, Abdul Aziz 
JCA, went a step further in theologising this matter. According to 
Aziz JCA, the name Allah ‘is sacred to the Muslims and is placed on 
the highest position and its sanctity must be protected’. Allah ‘refers to 
215
The Name of God on Trial
“oneness” and cannot be part of the concept of Trinity of Father, Son 
and the Holy Ghost of the Christian faith’; Allah ‘is a special name 
for the Muslim’s God’ (Aziz JCA 2013: [92]). 
Aziz JCA then returned to the recurrent theme of confusion: 
‘the use of the word “Allah” ... to describe or refer to God among 
Christian[s] would create confusion among Muslims as the concept of 
God in Islam and in Christianity is world[s] apart’ (Aziz JCA 2013: 
[92]). The third judge, Zawawi Salleh JCA, extended the confusing 
logic of confusion further: according to him, if the word ‘Allah’ is to 
be employed by Christians, ‘there will be a risk of misrepresentation 
of God within Christianity itself ... in other words, the potential for 
confusion is not confined only to Muslims but also to Christians’ 
(Zawawi JCA 2013: [139]). 
This ‘potential for confusion’ is akin to the following scenario: if I 
call my father Papa, and you call your father Papa, there is a risk that 
you will be confused that my Papa is your Papa, and your Papa is my 
Papa, or that we have the same Papa. The state therefore has to protect, 
not only Muslims, but also Christians from confusing their Gods. To 
prevent such confusion, Zawawi JCA had to step in to clear the air by 
proclaiming ex cathedra that ‘Allah is not the God of the Bible; Allah is 
a proper name and the only God in Islam’ (Zawawi JCA 2013: [137]). 
The Islamic theology that is presented by these three judges at the 
Court of Appeal is judicial theology, not classical or even orthodox 
Islamic theology. It is a judicial hybrid of Malaysian constitutional 
politics and Islam. Hence, scholars such as Tamir Moustafa, 
who criticised the Malaysian state for perverting the true Islamic 
jurisprudential tradition, may be correct, but that critique misses the 
point. As Moustafa himself recognised, ‘religious law is transformed 
as a result of incorporation as state law ... [and] subverted as a result of 
state appropriation’ (Moustafa 2014: 2). The Malaysian state’s Islamic 
law is itself ‘a break from the very tradition that it claims to represent’ 
(Moustafa 2014: 16). It is sui generis – truly one of a kind – for in no 
other Muslim-majority country in the world is there such a ban on the 
word Allah – nowhere else but in Malaysia. 
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The three Court of Appeal judges are living constitutionalists: 
they are grafting Islamic supremacy into the constitution and 
expanding the role of Islam beyond that which was envisaged at the 
time of founding. They may even be redemptive constitutionalists 
in the Coverian sense. They have a particular political-theological 
imagination of the Malaysian brand of Islam and a particular vision 
of the social order of the Malaysian nation. They have, in the words of 
Cover, a particular nomos. ‘A nomos is a present world constituted by 
a system of tension between reality and vision... our visions hold our 
reality up to us as unredeemed’ (Cover 1983: 9). These judges see the 
Malaysian constitution, as drafted by the founders, with its liberal and 
largely secular foundations, as fallen and in need of transformation, 
and crucially, redemption. They have a constitutional vision in which 
Islam would be preeminent. While the text of the constitution stays 
the same, they are investing it with new meanings, and in so doing, 
redeem the constitution from the colonial drafters. In an ironic twist, 
liberals in Malaysia are the originalists – they are the ones who appeal 
to original intent and insist that the constitution, as drafted by the 
founders, has liberal and largely secular foundations. 
The theological constitutionalism in Malaysia is a distinctly 
postcolonial project. The political governance of colonial British Malaya 
was largely secular. However, ‘colonial secularism’ was marked, not by 
any deep philosophical or ideological commitment to secularism, but 
by an ‘antipathy to religion’, specifically ‘native religion’ (Yeoh 2011: 
93). Native religion had, in various colonies, been the rallying point 
for rebellion against the colonial government. Hence, the role of native 
religion in the colonies had been actively marginalised and privatised 
by the colonial government. Postcolonial theological constitutionalism 
is the effort to reassert the nativist religious identity politically. In 
Malaysia, that desire to elevate native religion in the politics of identity 
is done through Islamising the constitution – but the paradox is that 
Islam is not exactly native either. 
If postcolonialism is ‘the politics of narration and counter-narration’, 
the current constitutional battle is reflective of the ‘unresolved identity 
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tensions stretching from colonialism to nationalism’ among the various 
religious communities in Malaysia (Mohamad 2008: 296, 311). Islam 
is defined in opposition to Christianity, with the latter constructed as 
the remnant of colonialism. 
5   Conclusion
On 23 June 2014, the Federal Court, the apex court in Malaysia, in 
a 4-3 decision, refused to grant the Catholic Church leave to appeal. 
After three judicial decisions on this matter – at the High Court, 
the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court – the contestation of 
constitutional narratives about law, religion and state will continue 
beyond the Federal Court. The judiciary does not have the final word 
– it never does. That is one of the reasons why judges write dissenting 
opinions. Dissents appeal directly to the people and to the future. It 
signals that today’s judgment is not final. A dissenting judgment builds 
a counter-narrative to the judicial narrative of the majority judgment. 
The judicial narrative of the majority is but one of the many narratives 
that are available for picking by the people. 
Neither judicial ruling nor bureaucratic simplif ication could 
restrict or constrict the people’s imagination. All decisions could 
be revisited and challenged judicially or extrajudicially. It could be 
revisited judicially when a subsequent court is presented with the 
opportunity and invited to overturn its precedent. It could be revisited 
and challenged extrajudicially, either in a constitutional manner 
through an amendment to the constitution or in an extraconstitutional 
manner through a political revolt. The losing side in a judicial battle 
can always live to fight another day. As this paper has tried to argue, 
the Malaysian Constitution contains an arsenal of weapons for both 
sides of the battle. To push the metaphor further, one could say that 
the Malaysian Constitution is at war with itself!  
There is, however, a silver lining in this constitutional battle. This 
contestation is happening within the framework of the constitution. 
Even when the judges are rewriting the constitution through 
reinterpretation, they at least try to couch what they are doing in terms 
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of constitutional law. The contest is in the courts, not on the streets, 
at least not yet. While the Malaysian Constitution may not have the 
benefit of stability, ironically, it may have the benefit of longevity. 
By allowing the two competing camps – the Islamic, conservative, 
revolutionists and the secular, liberal, evolutionists – to appeal to the 
same constitutional text, the ideological battle is contained within 
the constitution. The ideological battle is reframed and recast as a 
constitutional battle. The battle is a pitched battle, not a total warfare. 
In a bleak world, this is an achievement of sorts for constitutionalism 
in Malaysia. 
Notes
Joshua Neoh is a Lecturer in Law at the Australian National University. 
 (joshua.neoh@anu.edu.au)
I am grateful to the School of Arts and Social Sciences at Monash University 
in Malaysia for hosting me as a Visiting Fellow in January and July 2014, and 
organizing a seminar for me to present my views on this topic. The presence 
of the counsel for the appellant and the editor of The Herald, Mr S. Selvarajah 
and Fr Lawrence Andrew, at the seminar was immensely valuable in enriching 
the quality and depth of the discussion. This paper has also benefitted greatly 
from the insightful comments of James Chin, Greg Fealy, Kamal Solhaimi 
and Yeoh Seng Guan. Robert Cribb, a historian, and Francesca Merlan, an 
anthropologist, expanded my lawyerly worldview. Finally, I thank Tristian 
Delroy for his inquisitive and inquisitorial questions: he was an intellectual 
interlocutor par excellence.
References
Cover R 1983 ‘Nomos and Narrative’ Harvard Law Review 97: 4-68
Dawson B and S Thiru 2007 ‘The Lina Joy Case and the Future of Religious 
Freedom in Malaysia’ LAWASIA: Journal of the Law Association for Asia 
and the Pacific 2007: 151-162
El Fadl K 2001 Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women 
Oneworld Publications Oxford 
219
The Name of God on Trial
Evans C 2009 ‘Constitutional Narratives: Constitutional Adjudication on 
the Religion Clauses in Australia and Malaysia’ Emory International Law 
Review 23: 437-468
Federal Parliament of Malaysia 1 May 1958 Parliamentary Hansard House of 
Representatives Kuala Lumpur 
Fernando J 2002 The Making of the Malayan Constitution Malaysian Branch 
of Royal Asiatic Society Kuala Lumpur 
–   2006 ‘The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia’ Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 37: 249-266
Harding A 2002 ‘The Keris, the Crescent and the Blind Goddess: The State, 
Islam and the Constitution in Malaysia’ Singapore Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 6: 154-180
–   and H P Lee eds 2007 Constitutional Landmarks in Malaysia: The First 50 
Years LexisNexis Kuala Lumpur 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1957 Report of the Federation of Malaya 
Constitutional Commission 1957
Hirschl R 2010 Constitutional Theocracy Harvard University Press Cambridge 
Hobsbawm E and T Ranger eds 1983 The Invention of Tradition Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 
–   1983 ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’ in Hobsbawm  and Ranger 
1983: 1-14
Hooker B 1975 Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial 
Laws Clarendon Press Oxford 
Ibrahim A 1981 ‘Islamic Law in Malaysia‘ Journal of Malaysian and Comparative 
Law 8: 21-51
‘Malaysian Christians warn that Allah ban hurts country’s moderate Muslim 
image’ International Herald Tribune 7 January 2008 
Mohamad M 2008 ‘Malay/Malaysian/Islamic: Four Genres of Political 
Writings and the Postcoloniality of Autochthonous Texts’ Postcolonial 
Studies 11: 293-313 
Moustafa T 2014 ‘Judging in God’s Name: State Power, Secularism, and the 




Neoh J 2008 ‘Islamic State and the Common Law: A Case Study of Lina Joy’ 
Global Jurist 8: art 4
–   2010 ‘Legitimacy of the Common Law in Post-Colonial Malaysia’ 
LAWASIA: Journal of the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific 2010: 59-82
–   2013 ‘Text, Doctrine and Tradition in Law and Religion’ Oxford Journal 
of Law and Religion 2: 175-199
Nietzsche F 1996 On the Genealogy of Morals Trans D Smith Oxford University 
Press Oxford 
Peletz M 1993 ‘Sacred Texts and Dangerous Words: The Politics of Law and 
Cultural Rationalization in Malaysia’ Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 35: 66-109  
Scott J 1998 Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed Yale University Press New Haven
–  Tehranian J and J Mathias 2002 ‘The Production of Legal Identities Proper 
to States: The Case of the Permanent Family Surname’ Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 44: 4-44
Sunstein C 2007 ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law’ 
Social Research 74: 1-24
Thio L 2007 ‘Jurisdictional Imbroglio: Civil and Religious Courts, Turf 
Wars and Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution’ in Harding and 
Lee 2007: 197-226
Yeoh S G 2011 ‘In Defence of the Secular? Islamisation, Christians and (New) 
Politics in Urbane Malaysia’ Asian Studies Review 35: 83-103 
Cases
Che Omar bin Che Soh v Public Prosecutor [1988] 2 MLJ 55
Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan [2007] 4 MLJ 585
Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors v Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala 
Lumpur [2013] 6 MLJ 468 (Apandi Ali, Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahim and 
Zawawi Salleh JJCA) 
Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v Menteri Dalam Negeri 
& Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 78 (Lau Bee Lan J) 
